номера разделов тут полетели. все должны начинаться на 2, а не на 1.
1 Modalities in narratology
1.1 Why modalities?
The narrative is about causality but not about an objectivistic causality where the events are independent from the observer. It is rather similar to the explanations in quantum physics where the events themselves and their causality are directly depending on the way of observation. Thus, a novel could bear the title “Crime and Punishment” but it will be not about necessity or probability of the consequence between crime and punishment in any classical logical sense. Instead, it will be about the conditions of the experiment where the logical implication Crime ® Punishment can be testified, taking into account that there are others where it cannot. In this way, the events in the narrative are the quantum events.
Given that an implication of the role of the “observer” is unavoidable, the logic of the plot development in the narrative could be interpreted as modal logic.
The above demonstration why the logic of the plot should be modal logic is rather evident but it became possible only recently, in the light of the interpretation of modal logic within the classical framework. Before this, the question Why?, applied to the narrative modalities, was without answer.
The same demonstration is also applicable to the “logic of grammar” in linguistics. It is difficult to imagine how the speaker could construct his phrases without any implication of his own position. The mere fact of such an implication is enough to make the logical construction of his phrases modal.
1.2 Doležel’s modalities
The logical modalities of narrative were not deduced but were discovered, or, better, recognized in Propp’s “functions” already described for the folktale. The number of Propp’s “functions” (plot’s parts considered as elementary) was 31 for the simplest example of magical folktale. When Étienne Souriau (1950) repeated the work of Propp (independently, without knowing Propp’s (1928) seminal monograph) but for more complicated objects, theatre plays, the number of “situations dramatiques” (analogues of Propp’s “functions”) was two hundred thousand. Looking at these calculations of Propp and Souriau, Greimas (1966) caught the insight that these innumerable “functions” are to be reduced to several modalities.
These modalities were first described in a systematic way by Doležel (1976; 1999). Doležel attributed to the modalities the shaping of the fictional worlds of narratives that gives them “the potential to produce (generate) stories” (Doležel 1998, 113).
Doležel’s main attention was concentred on the three modalities already studied by von Wright, and, after him, especially by Jaakko Hintikka: alethic (von Wright 1951), epistemic (Hintikka 1962; Hintikka and Hintikka 1989), and deontic (von Wright 1968; Hintikka 1971). To these three modalities he added the fourth, axiological (logic of values), whose pioneering study by Nicholas Rescher (1969/2006) appeared several years before (see now also (Rescher 2004)). Unfortunately, Doležel was unaware of the parallel and independent studies of logic of values by Alexander Ivin (Ivin 1970; Iwin 1975).
The four modal logics were chosen just because it was demonstrated that they are really playing some role in story producing. It was moreover important that the formal structure of all the corresponding logical operators corresponds to the triplet structure of logical quantifiers “all” (" or ¬$¬), “some” ($), and “none” (¬$). The formal structure of the modal operators follows from the requirement of modal completeness (which is the modal analogue of the excluded middle principle of the formal logic).
Thus, Doležel proposed the following table (Doležel 1998, 114):
Operators | |||||||||||
Quantifiers | Alethic | Deontic | Axiological | Epistemic | |||||||
$ | some | M | possible | P | permitted | G | good | K | known | ||
¬$ | none | ¬M | impossible | ¬P | prohibited | ¬G | bad | ¬K | unknown | ||
¬$¬ | all | ¬M¬ | necessary | ¬P¬ | obligatory | ¬G¬ | indifferent | K_{0} | believed | ||
“The number of these systems, four, is not magical. In accordance with the general character of our fictional semantics, narrative modalities are declared an open set. If other semantic categories are identified logically as modalities and proved significant for formation of narrative worlds, then they should be accepted into the set.” (Doležel 1998, 257, n. 3). These worlds should be comprehended in the sense that the list of the relevant modalities is still open, but not in the sense that it is an open list by nature. Doležel does not pronounce himself whether the number of the narrative modalities is limited or not.