1 Epistemic modality
Cinque distinguishes between “evidential mood” and “epistemic modality.”
- direct evidence
Cinque’s understanding of “epistemic” is the same as in the philosophical literature (von Wright 1951) but his understanding of possible values of this epistemic (as “commitment” and lack thereof) is at odds with the epistemic modal logic. Indeed, the triplet of ‹1, 1› epistemic modal operators is “known—unknown—believed.” All of them are expressions of speaker’s commitment in the corresponding truth, but commitment itself is no more than a feature of knowledge as modality. Thus, I think, Cinque’s linguistic data concerning the epistemic modality must be reordered according to the epistemic modal triplet.
Cinque’s “evidential mood” corresponds to the subjective criterion of evaluation of the truth. This is nothing but the epistemic preference in the sense of Nicholas Rescher (see above, sect. 7), that is, the ‹1, 1, 1› type epistemic modal operator.
2 Axiological modality
Cinque’s “evaluative mood” is nothing but axiological modality. The corresponding binary opposition “fortunate—unfortunate” is Cinque’s approximation of the axiological triplet “good—bad—indifferent.”
It is interesting to recheck the linguistic data to know whether the ‹1, 1, 1› type axiological modal operator (axiological preference) is grammatically represented, too.
3 Deontic modality
Cinque treats deontic modality dividing it into two different modalities (“obligation” and “ability/permission”), in the same manner as he does with alethic modality. In the same manner, Cinque inscribes into two rows of his table the complete square of the ‹1, 1› type modal operator:
- [ - obligation]
- [ - ability/permission]
Again, the question arises: whether the internal negation (“no obligation”) of the deontic some operator “permitted” is really represented grammatically or it appears in Cinque’s table as a result of confusion with the operator of deontic preference. Anyway, the question of the possible grammatical representation of the deontic preference operator is open.
4 Volition modality
The words “modality of volition” were familiar to linguists even before the modal logic “boom” of the 1950s but they could be shrewd to logician’s ear. However, it is easy to see that volition is often irreducible to values and duties, and so, a modal logic of volition is possible apart from the logics of deontic and axiological modalities. The operators of the corresponding logic of volition and the set of the basic axioms will be the same as those of the logics of values and duties.
Thus, the modal operators of volition of type ‹1, 1› have to form the triplet “willed—unwilled/repelling—indifferent,”
Cinque ascribes to the volition modality the binary opposition “volition—no volition” which is a rough but acknowledgeable approximation of the correct modal operators.
I think that here Cinque’s linguistic analysis could be of help to the narratology. Of course, the matter is needed to be studied further but, even at first glance, the modal logic of volition as a specific plot-creating force seems to be very convincing. If so, our table of narratological modalities (see above, sect. 16) is to be enlarged by adding new column “volition.”
Now we have exhausted the list of functional heads unrelated to spatiotemporal modalities.