Jerry Fodor (Rutgers University)
This Seminar is available to all students but some background in formal linguistics or cognitive psychology is strongly recommended
What is a concept? We review answers to this question proposed in philosophy and cognitive science. We then consider the provocative suggestion that concepts have no semantic properties except reference and that the metaphysics of reference is causal. Why, though both are probably true, does practically nobody believe either? The reading for the course is Fodor and Pylyshyn’s ms. Minds without Meanings.
1. Background: Why philosophers and cognitive scientists care what concepts are.
2. Constraints on theories of concepts.
3. Standard theories of concepts in philosophy and cognitive science.
4. Standard theories of concepts (continued).
5. A purely referential semantics? Frege's argument that there must be ‘senses’; Quine's argument that reference is `indeterminate'.
6. If there are no senses, what determines reference?
7. Objections to `purely referential` semantics.
8. Summary and conclusions.
Ранняя регистрация на школу заканчивается 10 апреля.
Если останутся места, то поздняя регистрация -- до 31 мая.